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BOOK REVIEW
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE (Medical Ethics Series). Edited by

Robert F. Weir. Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 1997. Pp. 304.
$29.95. ISBN: 0253332826.
Is assistancein suicidea fundamentalconstitutionalright? Should
physician-assistedsuicide (PAS) be legalized? These two questions
have galvanizedthe debateover PAS for the past decade. They likewise
shape the essays in this volume. It is perhapsunfortunatethat these
questionswere answered,the second at least provisionally,in the same
year this volume was published. For 1997 witnessed the landmark
decisions of the SupremeCourtin Washingtonv Glucksberg,521 US
702 (1997), and Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793 (1997), as well as the
implementationof the equallyhistoricOregonDeath with Dignity Act
(Measure 16). One wondershow the distinguishedscholars gathered
heremighthave engagedthese developmentsin theiressays.
Nonetheless,this volume providesvaluablehistoricalbackground
and penetratinglyanalyzesconceptual,legal, and policy issues at stake
with PAS. For legal scholars, it provides valuable models for
interpretinglegal decisions and public policy. Remarkablefor their
clarity, these essays are equally accessible to students or thoughtful
citizenstrulyinterestedin how to thinkaboutandrespondto PAS.
It is a creditto RobertWeirthathe could producea book like this.
For he has collected a set of compelling argumentsagainst his own
position. Elsewhere, Weir has argued that PAS ought to be
decriminalized.1His prefacethat introducesthe essays clearly reflects
this position. The prefaceleaves one with the impressionthatconsensus
favoringPAS is buildingand that legalizationis only a matterof time.
It was surprising,then, to find that among the ten authors (two
marshaledfor each section),only threeclearlysupportPAS. While the
"reasonablepersons"on this panel certainlydisagree,those who oppose
PAS advance better argumentsand are able to mount more careful,
cogentandpersuasivecases.
Both essays in Part One, Historical Interpretation,provide
1. Robert F. Weir, The Morality of Physician Assisted Suicide, Law, Medicine, & Health
Care 20 (1992).
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importantcontextualizingbackground. Readerswill find themselves
readingand interpretinglater authors'claims in light of the narratives
and accountspresentedhere. The book could not have begun with a
better essay than DarrelW. Amundsen's,the only one in the book to
deal in any way with religion. Two discrete objectives shape
Amundsen'sproject. First, he highlights the complex issue of how
historicalwarrantsought to be deployed in developing legal opinion.
Anyone charged with writing legal decisions would profit from this
piece. Second, Amundsenis clearly vexed. And he should be. The
problem is identified in the title of his essay: The Significance of
Inaccurate History in Legal Considerations of Physician Assisted

Suicide. In order to underminethe challenge presentedby Christian
convictions, PAS advocates have engaged what can at best be labeled

"revisionisthistory,"but more accuratelyis simply incompetentand
irresponsible scholarship. By distorting the historical corpus,
inexcusably conflating martyrdom and suicide, anachronistically
applyingcontemporaryconcepts to antiquity,and lacking basic sociohistoricalmethods,such advocateshave re-narrated
earlyChristianityas
eitheropento or activelyencouragingsuicide.
More importantly, bad scholarship has legs, especially bad
scholarshipthat serves a public agenda. Trumpetedwithin media
campaigns,such conclusionscome to be believedby the generalpublic.
And they wend theirway into centersof influence. Amundsenoffersthe
example of Michigan CircuitCourt Judge Kaufman's 1993 "Opinion
and Order Concerningthe Constitutionalityof the Michigan Statute
ProscribingAssisted Suicide." He pulls no punches in criticizing
Kaufman'saccount. But he reserveshis most scathing critiquefor a
theologianand a patristicscholar,ArthurJ. Droge and JamesD. Tabor,
for their recent book, A Noble Death: Suicide and Martyrdom among
Christians and Jews in Antiquity (Harper, 1992). Amundsen charges

them with "faddish linguistic deconstructionism and historical
revisionismthatareblatantlyanachronisticanddo violence to the texts."
(10)2 Amundsenretrieves significantearly Christiantexts carefully,
precisely, and systematically.3 He ably refutes the claim that most

Christianmartyrsactuallyvolunteeredor took theirown lives. He traces
patristic commentary on suicide. And he demolishes the conflation
between martyrdomand suicide.

HaroldY. Vanderpoollocatesthe contemporary
PAS debatewithin
2. All citations in the text refer to the book under review.
3. For a more developed account, highly recommended, see Edward J. Larson & Darrel W.
Amundsen, A Different Death: Euthanasia and the Christian Tradition (InterVarsity Press, 1998).

This content downloaded from 134.48.159.104 on Wed, 11 Sep 2013 17:57:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

431]

BOOKREVIEW

433

the history of Americanphysicians' "traditions"of thought,advocacy
and practicevis-a-vis the dying of their patients. He begins with the
1847 AMA Code of Ethics, which first codified physician's
responsibilities to dying patients, enjoining them to attend at the
bedside, administertherapeuticsand serve as "ministersof hope and
comfort to the sick." Although medicalizationof dying begins to
emergeeven withinthis phase, a shift occursas the centuryprogresses,
propelled by technological developments-the invention of the
hypodermicand advancesin analgesics. In 1873, a new variableenters
the picture,namely,a proposalfromEnglandadvocatingeuthanasia.In
Vanderpool'saccount,the debateover euthanasiawas strikingin a key
regard: the arguments advanced, for and against euthanasia, are
remarkablycontemporary.All warrantsassertedtodayregardingPASsave autonomy-merely echo turn-of-the-century
arguments.
Vanderpool'snarrativerecountshow dying became an object of
control,with physicianscentralizingcontrolthroughthe hospitalization
of dying until the 1970s when movements for patient-controlover
medicalizeddying emerged. The contemporarydebate continues this
struggle. Vanderpoolcomes closer thanhis colleaguesto showinghow
patientattitudestowardend-of-life issues are so deeply constructedby
technologyandcultureso as to renderthe notionof "self-determination"
a tragicmyth.
Moreover, he shows that it was within a relatively short time
period-from 1840 to 1950-that an amazingmetamorphosisoccurred
in the social ecology of dying. Seen in the 1840s as substantively
centralto one's individuallife narrative,the dying process was deemed
so profoundlyimportantthat"Tobe presentat a friend's,neighbor's,or
family member's death was looked upon as a 'great' or 'very great
privilege." (35) By the 1950s dying had become something to be
avoided. Physicians believed "that patients would be emotionally
devastatedif they discoveredthat their lives could not be prolonged"
and "a 'collective mood' developed-the desire not to be present at
death." (45) Vanderpool's essay demonstrateshow contemporary
attitudesand practices,often invoked as timeless, universaltruths,are
culturalartifactsof relativelyrecentvintage.
Part Two explores Ethical Assessments and Positions.

Daniel

Callahanand Dan W. Brock face off over whetheror not PAS could
ever be ethically or morallyjustifiable. Callahanargues that PAS is
both intrinsicallyand consequentiallywrong. The prospectof socially
legitimatingPAS throughlegalizationconcerns him most. Callahan
methodicallyoutlines the principalargumentsagainst PAS. The care,

This content downloaded from 134.48.159.104 on Wed, 11 Sep 2013 17:57:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

434

JOURNALOF LAW& RELIGION

[Vol.XIII

precision,and clarityof his analysisis a model of bioethicaldiscourse.
The argumentshe marshalsandthe critiqueshe registerswill be familiar
to those acquaintedwith the PAS debate-that PAS concentrates
excessive power in the physicians' hands, that it disproportionately
values individualself-determinationover the common good, that the
Netherlands' experiment evidences that the practice cannot be
contained,andthatPAS wouldintrinsicallyalterthe medicalpractice.
Five points are worth highlighting. Callahanfirst states a claim
that recursthroughoutthe essays, namely that "the distinctionbetween
euthanasiaand PAS is not morallysignificant."(71) In both cases, the
physician is causally involved and so is equally culpable. Related to
this, he notes how fictive the notion of self-determination
is; insofaras
both PAS and euthanasiarequireanotherperson's assistance,it is "a
mutual, social decision between two people." (74) Third, legalizing
PAS would representa profoundturningpoint in Westernculture,by
creating "one more socially toleratedreason for one person to kill
another or to assist another to kill herself." (72) This he finds
incongruous,insofaras on most fronts(for example,the deathpenalty,
war),socio-politicalopinionis beginningto challengethesepractices.
Fourth,Callahantakes on those who would erase the distinction
between killing and allowing to die. Here Callahantruly advancesthe
debate by distinguishingbetween causality and culpability. Wherein
lies the error of those who wish to equate a physician removing a
respiratorfrom a patientdying of ALS with injectinga lethal drug or
providinga pill? Callahanmaintainsthat in the formercase, the cause
of death would be the underlyingdisease, whereas in the latter two
cases, the cause is the pharmacologicagent. In both cases, however,
culpabilitycan be assigned. One might turn off a respiratorwithout
consent or for ulteriormotives; one might administera lethal dose
unintentionally. In both cases, culpability differs, one being held
culpablefor the patientsdeathdifferentlyin the formerinstancethanin
the latter. Thus the error for those who would equate killing and
allowingto die
lies in confusingcausalityandculpabilityandin failingto notethe
way in whichhumansocietieshave overlaidnaturalcauseswith
. ..]udgements of moral
moral rules and interpretations
responsibility and culpability are human constructs.....

When

physicianscould do nothingto stop death,they were not held
responsiblefor it. When,with medicalprogress,they began to
have some power over death ....

moral rules were devised to set

forththeirobligations.Naturalcauseswerenot therebybanished.
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They were, instead,overlaidwith a medical ethic designedto
determinemoralculpabilityin deployingmedicalpower.(78-79)
Finally, Callahantraces self-determinationand individual wellbeing to their logical conclusions, demonstratingthat once PAS
instantiatesthese principles,there will be no logical place, no good
moralreason,fromwhichto limit euthanasiaandPAS:
If we really believe in self-determination,
then any competent
personshouldhavea rightto be killedby a doctorfor any reason
thatsuitshimandno less to be assistedin suicide. If we believein
thereliefof suffering,thenit seemscruelandcapriciousto denyit
to the incompetent.Thereis, in short,no reasonableor logical
stoppingpoint once the turnhas been made down the road to
or PAS.(83)
euthanasia
Callahan'sconclusionproves propheticin the next essay, by Dan
Brock, whose arguments Callahan has just surgically demolished.
Brock's"centralethicalargument"restson the "twofundamentalethical
values" of "individualself-determinationor autonomyand individual
well-being." (89) Brock employs these concepts, however, in an
unnuancedfashion, failing to attend to the manifold ways in which
"choice"is constrained,coercedand constructedby disease and society.
Like Callahan,BrockmaintainsthateuthanasiaandPAS arenot morally
distinct,but he takes it one step further. If public policy allows one,
says Brock,it shouldadmitthe other. WarrantsthatsupportPAS should
likewise justify voluntary active euthanasia(VAE). This position,
pairedwith his candidexpansionof the conceptof pain and sufferingto
include "psychological suffering" unrelated to physical pain, only
proves Callahan'spoint that it will be impossibleto limit socially and
legally sanctionedPAS. Finally, Brock seeks to equate killing and
allowing to die, redefining the latter as "ethicallyjustified killing."
Even without Callahan'scompellingre-descriptionof this issue or the
SupremeCourt'sreaffirmationof the distinctionin its 1997 decisions,
Brock's own argumentis extremely problematic. The examples he
marshalswould strikemost people as ethicallyproblematiceven if legal,
such as "whenan apparentlycompetentpatientmakes an informedand
voluntarychoice to refuse life-sustainingtreatmentthat would restore
the patientto full functionand a life thatmost people would considera
life well worthhaving."(95)
OtherproblemsplagueBrock'sessay. I will simplymentiona few.
Brock repeatedlystressesthathe is only addressingthe moral question
of individualacts ratherthanthe legal questionssurroundingPAS as a
social practice. Yet he repeatedlyturnsto policy to warranthis own
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argumentand confusesthe legal and the moral.(95-96) He essentially
limits the moral determinantto autonomy or self-determination,a
position that conflicts even with common sense. He proclaims as
timeless truthsstatementssuch as: "Individualself-determinationhas
specialimportancein choices aboutthe time andmannerof one's death,
including assisted suicide;" (89) ". . . it is especially important that

individualscontrolto the extentpossiblethe manner,circumstances,and
timing of their dying and death."(90) After reading Vanderpool's
essay, one can only respond"Since when?" Finally, Brock makes a
novel move, redefiningthe "moralcenter"of medicine as respecting
and promotingtheirwell-being. Again this
patients'self-determination
is assertedratherthan demonstrated.As a "value"of relativelyrecent
deservesa bit longerto maturebefore
vintage,patientself-determination
becomingmedicine'smoralcenter.
Part Three, Medical Practices and Perspectives, turns to physician

voices. Here Ira R. Byock, M.D. and Howard Brody, MD debate
whetheror not physician-assistedsuicide is an acceptablepracticefor
physicians. The argumentsare, for the most part,familiar,thoughboth
essays are ably done andworthreading. Byock answersin the negative,
identifyingand challengingassumptionsabout the medical profession
underlyingthe PAS debate. His responses to these assumptionsare
thoughtful, reflecting a seasoned medical practitioner's concrete
experience. He ultimatelyconcludesthat PAS is a call to the medical
professionfor self-reformand nationalleadership:"thecrisis of end-oflife care presentsan opportunityfor the professionof medicine to take
strong and corrective action and, in so doing, assert a traditional
leadership role ...

it can model for society a caring ethic." (128)

Howard Brody argues that assistance in patient suicides is an
acceptable practice for physicians, if the practice is carefully
circumscribedby oversightand safeguardsandmade availableonly to a
limitedpatientpopulation.Proceedingcarefullyandprudentially,Brody
first advances several argumentssupportingPAS and then arguments
opposingPAS which he deems "alsoquiteweighty."(138) Ratherthan
arguingthe "pro"side, however,he insteadattemptsto show why the
opposing argumentsare less compellingthan they might first appear.
These argumentsdisfavoringPAS include: professionalintegrity;the
adequacyof safeguards;the effect of PAS on hospice care;PAS as the
medicalizationof death;andphysicianincompetenceto administerPAS.
The very statementof these concerns illustratesprofounddifficulties
with PAS, andBrodydoes littleto assuagethose difficulties.
His counterarguments
are not as compellingas he might wish, for
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they require significant assumptions. For example, he counters the
charge that PAS underminesprofessionalintegrityby redefining the
goals of medicineas "healing,preventingillness, and helping the dying
patient to achieve a peaceful and dignified death." (141, emphasis
added) So redefined,PAS would not undercutprofessionalintegrity.
Even following Vanderpool'saccount,however,the redefinitionof the
goal of medicineas one of assistingdeathis of relativelyrecentvintage
and of dubiouscentralityin the self-understanding
of physicians. With
regardto the effect of PAS on hospicecare,Brodyproposesan oversight
mechanismwhich includes palliative care specialists on a team that
would determine which patients would be "morally appropriate
candidates"and recommendsthat "almostall patients would have to
undergo a trial of hospice care before being viewed as potential
candidates"for PAS. The implementationof this proposal would
require coopting palliative care personnel, requiring them to
compromisetheirfundamentalprinciplesandto cooperatewith evil both
formallyandmaterially.Practically,then,this proposalseems dubious.
Part Four examines PAS from the perspective of Potentially
VulnerablePatients. An essay by KristiL. Kirshner,MD, CarolJ. Gill
andChristineK. Cassel,MD, provideslittle new to readersfamiliarwith
the debateon PAS. The essay revisits threeclassic cases of refusal of
life-sustaining treatment/assisted-suicide
by people with disabilities:
David Rivlin, LarryMcAfee, and ElizabethBouvia. They conclude,
aptly,thatthese cases demonstratenot a desire"to exercisecontrolover
theirbodies and medicaltreatment,[but]a desire to escape the socially
constructed part of disability-the pain of prejudice, economic
deprivation,exclusionfromthe community,and unnecessarilyrestricted
choices." (163) Their conclusion, however, is intriguingand novel.
They note that the emphasiswithin the disabilityrights communityon
"self-determination"
may catch it in a contradictionwhen it then moves
to oppose PAS. Ratherthan endorsingPAS, however, the authorsreread self-determinationfrom the perspectiveof a disabledperson. In
the end they concludeunsurprisingly:
In a countrythat does not guaranteeaccess to health care or
adequatesupportfor dignifiedassistedliving to all its citizens,
disempowered
populationsmaybe morevulnerableto thepressure
to requestPAS and otherformsof physicianassistancein dying.
People with abridgedchoices due to social devaluationand
economicoppressionwho are offereddeathas an optionmay be
moreinclinedto choosethis paththanpatientswith a numberof
optionsavailableto them,and this may includepeople who are
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elderly,chronicallyill, pooranddisabled.(164)
Feministlegal scholarSusanM. Wolf contributesan essay entitled
Physician-AssistedSuicide, Abortion, and TreatmentRefusal: Using
Genderto Analyzethe Difference. This is by far one of the strongest
and most interestingarticles in the volume from a legal perspective.
Wolf offers reasons for consideringgender relevantto the debate on
physician-assisted suicide. She also carefully re-reads Planned
Parenthood v Casey, 510 US 1309 (1994), and Cruzan v Director,
MissouriDepartmentof Health,497 US 261 (1990), showinghow their
deploymentby the lower courtsin Quill v Vacco,Compassionin Dying
v Washington,122 F3d 1262 (9th Cir 1997), and then Washingtonv
Glucksbergradically misread the precedent cases and in no way
establisheda protectedlibertyinterestthatwould grounda constitutional
right to obtainassisted suicide. Her analysis is careful and insightful.
Two interpretivepointsarekey: (1) Cruzanand Caseyconcerna rightto
be free of the bodily invasions(unwantedtreatmentandpregnancy),not
a right to be able to obtainan invasion in orderto end one's life; (2)
Cruzan and Casey establish an entitlement to live free, not an
entitlementto surrenderfreedomthroughdeath. In Wolf s view, PAS,
located in a history which valorizes women's self-sacrifice and
encourageswomen's deaths, rendersPAS "a fatal threatto women's
equality."(170) She closes by reviewingcountervailingstate interests
in opposingassistedsuicide.
The final section takes up Public Policy Options and
Recommendations. An essay by Steven Miles, M.D., Demetra M.
Pappas,J.D., and RobertKoepp analyzes three proposals:the Oregon
Death with Dignity Act (Measure16), the Rights of the TerminallyIll
Bill of the NorthernTerritoryof Australia(which took effect July 1,
1996, and which was repealed shortly afterwardsby the federal
legislatureof Australia,which may overrideterritoriallegislation),and
that proposedby FranklinMiller,TimothyQuill, HowardBrody, John
Fletcher,LarryGostin,et al.4 This essay is equalin rigor,perceptivity,
and importance to Wolf s. Reading these proposals against the
historicallandmarksof bioethicslaw and policy, their thesis is simple
but compelling:that the safeguardsdesigned to enhance respect for
patient autonomyunderminetwo decades of the protectionof patient
autonomy, resurrect medical paternalism,and discriminate against
minors,the incompetent,anddisabledpersons.
Theirargumentsare extensiveand complex. I will highlightonly
4. See Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 New England J Med 119-24 (1994).
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two of their points. At issue is whether or not PAS representsa
fundamentalright. If so, it should be made available to all patients,
competentand incompetent,physicallydisabledand nondisabled. Yet,
insofar as these proposals disallow "advance directed, substituted
judgement,or best intereststandardsfor decision making on behalf of
decisionallyincapablepersons,"(215) they discriminateunjustlyagainst
those who cannot articulate and/or carry out their own wishes.
Moreover,they questionphysicians'new extrajudicialauthorityto deny
this "treatmentoption"to legally competentpatientsbecausethe patients
give the wrong reasons or because they do not meet certain criteria:
"These restrictionsare novel in that the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, or indeed to consent to (or refuse) any other medical
treatment,is nowhereelse contingenton terminalillness, proximityto
death,or reversibility."(219)
In the final essay William J. Winsladesuggests two policy types
thatmight be optionsin the currentsituation. The first entails "legally
excusing"physicianswho admitparticipationin PAS. Assisted suicide
would remainillegal but physicianswould be allowed to demonstrate
thattheiractionconstituteda properexception. The secondpolicy route
wouldbe to "regulatea rightto PAS." Althoughhe appearsto favorthis
proposal,he does not advancereasonsfor its adoption.
This volume offers a valuable model of how to do historical,
ethical, and legal analysis. Ratherthan simply being a collection of
disjointedessays, the contributionsartfullyinteract,so that arguments
advanced by one author are addressed,refuted, and/or nuanced by
others.
Threeimportantgeneralobservationsaboutthe PAS debateemerge
from the confluence of these essays. First, althoughdistinctionsand
notions of intention,motive, the relationshipbetween cause and effect,
the magnitude of effect, the balancing of individual good and the
commongood are centralto law, PAS advocatesseek to efface critical
conceptual,moral,and legal distinctions. Second,althoughthe impetus
for PAS often seems simply to logically extend bioethics as it has
developedover the past thirtyyears,the essays in this volume show how
it would in fact be a radical departurefrom the tradition'swisdom.
Third,readingfromVanderpoolto Miles, it becomes clearthatthe issue
of power remainsa centralissue: physiciansfeel disempoweredwhen
facing patient pain, suffering, and death; patients seek power and
"control." Even the phrase "allowingto die" betrays the continuing
fictionthatpowerover deathlies in medicine'shands.
Finally, more attentionneeds to be paid to how public attitudes
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toward and patient experiencesof dying are socially constructedand
how the practiceand discoursecoopts both physiciansand patientsinto
reproducingparticularsocial values. Too often, physician,patient,or
publicsurveysareinvokedwithoutattendingto the social locationof the
populationsurveyed or to how these opinions have been shaped by
social and economicforces. One mightargue,for example,that claims
that dying is a personal and private matterthat individualsought to
controlreflect contemporarytrendstowardcommodificationof human
life; now even the "right to life" is seen as something one owns,
propertyto be disposed of as one sees fit. This attitudeof relatively
recentvintagefits withina spectrumof like beliefs shapedin largepart
market.
by the forcesof a biotechnologically-driven
In the end, this volume providestools for interpretingcontinuing
developmentson the PAS front and stimulatesthe need for further
analysis,whetherit be JackKevorkian'srecentconvictionor Oregon's
sobering decision authorizingMedicaid payments for PAS-for the
poor.
M. Therese Lysaught t

t

Assistant Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Dayton University, Dayton, Ohio.

This content downloaded from 134.48.159.104 on Wed, 11 Sep 2013 17:57:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

